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A CROSS TO BEAR: THE NEED TO WEIGH CONTEXT IN
DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS ON PUBLIC LAND
CATHERINE ANSELLO*
INTRODUCTION

In Buono v. Kempthorne,1 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
a legislatively prescribed transfer of public land to private hands
violated the district court's injunction prohibiting the display of a Latin
3
cross 2 on that public land. The court concluded that the situation
surrounding the land transfer constituted an unusual circumstance,
removing the exchange from the ordinary rule that land transfers are a
legitimate and effective way of negating an Establishment Clause
violation.4 Although the court correctly determined the land transfer
itself to be invalid, the court failed to adequately consider the factors
supporting constitutionality of the presence of the cross prior to the
land transfer. 6 None of the four courts considering the Buono case
gave adequate deference to the Supreme Court's charge to weigh the
context of a religious symbol before the symbol is deemed
unconstitutional. 7 As a result, the Buono courts' all-or-nothing
approach caused continued litigation and extended governmental
efforts to preserve the cross.8
I. THE CASE
In the middle of Mojave National Preserve (hereinafter "the
Preserve"), located in the Mojave Desert in California, sat a Latin

J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, 2009.
1. Buono v. Kempthome, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007).
2. As the United States District Court for the Central District of California has noted,
"[t]he Latin cross is the preeminent symbol of Christianity. It is exclusively a Christian
symbol, and not a symbol of any other religion." Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202,
1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
3. Buono, 502 F.3d at 1071.
4. Id. at 1077.
5. See infra Part W.B.
6. See infra Part W.A.
7. See infra Part IV.A.
8. See infra Part W.A.
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cross between five and eight feet tall. 9 The National Park Service
maintains and operates the Preserve.' 0 The federal and state
governments own about ninety-five percent of the land within the
Preserve." The cross sat atop a visible rock outcropping within the
Preserve, and vehicles traveling on a nearby road could see the cross
from approximately 100 yards away. 12
In 1934, before Congress created the Preserve, the Veterans of
Foreign Wars erected the cross to memorialize veterans who died in
the line of duty during World War 1.13 Originally, signs erected around
the cross identified it as a tribute to these veterans; however, the signs
were no longer in place at the time of trial. 14 The Preserve has
historically been used for both secular and religious purposes. Private
parties have held Easter services near the cross since 1935, and the
area where the cross is located is also used as a public camping
ground. 15
In 1999, an individual wrote a letter to the National Park7
16
Service requesting permission to erect a stupa within the Preserve.'
In response, the National Park Service denied permission to construct
the Buddhist symbol and agreed to remove the cross.' 8 Several months
later, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) wrote a letter to the
National Park Service threatening legal action if the cross was not
removed.' 9 In response, local citizens informed the National Park
Service that there would be considerable public outcry if the
organization complied with the ACLU's demands to remove the
cross.
National
informed the
ACLUit. 21
that it
intended The
to remove
the Park
cross,Service
but did then
not immediately
remove

9. Buonov. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204-05 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The Preserve,
predominately made up of federal land, stretches over about 2500 square miles. Id. at 1205.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The original cross has been replaced by private individuals replaced several
times since 1934. Id.
15. Id.
16. A stupa is a "dome-shaped Buddhist shrine .... Id. at 1205-06.
17. Id. The letter's author identified himself as Sherpa San Harold Horpa. Id. at 1206.
Horpa, also known as Herman R. Hoops, is an acquaintance of Buono and a retired National
Park Service employee. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.Indeed, the private individuals who maintained the cross refused to voluntarily
remove the cross, and expressed that they would replace the cross if it were removed. Id.
21. Id.
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In November 2000, a county supervisor contacted a California
22
congressman to protest "the removal of the 'veteran's memorial.'
Within one month, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations
Act,2 3 forbidding the use of federal funds for removal of the cross.24 In
January 2002, Congress passed the Department of Defense and

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery From and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act ("the
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act"), which designated the
Mojave Preserve's cross as a national memorial, and allocated funds to
erect a memorial plaque near the cross. 25
Just before Congress passed the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, Frank Buono brought suit in the United States
26
District Court of California, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.
Buono argued the presence of the cross on federal land violated his
constitutional rights under the Establishment Clause of the First

Amendment. 27 Defendants Gail Norton, John
Reynolds, and Mary
28
Martin filed a motion for summary judgment.
A. Buono I

Buono v. Norton ("Buono /")considered the constitutionality
of the presence of a Latin cross on federal land.2 9 According to the
court, the Establishment Clause "certainly means at the very least that
government may not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect
or creed (including a preference for Christianity over other
31
religions).",30 Applying the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman

22. Id.
23. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554 §133, 114 Stat. 2763A-230
(2000).
24. Id.
25. Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery
From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, Pub. L. No. 107-117 §8137,
115 Stat. 2278-79 (2002), codified at 16 U.S.C. §410aaa-56.
26. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204 (C.D. Cal. 2002). In October of 2001,
Allen Schwartz was added as a co-plaintiff. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id at 1203-04. Defendants Norton and Reynolds work for the National Park Service,
and Defendant Martin is Superintendent of the Preserve. Id. at 1209. Plaintiffs also
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1204.
29. Id. at 1214. Defendants also challenged Plaintiffs' standing, which was discussed in
depth by the District Court and ultimately found to exist. Id. at 1210-14.
30. Id. at 1214.
31. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). A government religious practice or
symbol survives an alleged Establishment Clause violation when: 1)it has a secular purpose,
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(hereinafter the "Lemon test"), the district court held 32 the cross
violated the Establishment Clause without considering the first prong
of the Lemon test "because the primary effect of the presence of the
cross advances religion." 33 The court relied heavily on a parallel Ninth
Circuit case, Separation of Church and State Committee v. City of
Eugene.34 The City of Eugene court determined the presence of a cross
was a "straightforward" violation of the second prong of the Lemon
test, notwithstanding the fact that Congress designated the cross as a
war memorial. 3 The court noted that while the physical setting of a
particular religious symbol is important, the location of the cross in the
Preserve led to the conclusion that "a reasonable observer would36
believe that such land and the cross are owned by the government."
The City of Eugene court considered both the size of the cross and the
amount of public exposure it received to be irrelevant. 37 Because the
presence of the cross in the Preserve conveyed a message of
government endorsement of religion, the court granted the plaintiffs'
motion for summary
judgment, thus prohibiting any continued display
38
of the cross.
B. Buono II
Following the disposition of Buono I, in Buono v. Norton
("Buono If'), the defendants appealed the case to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, which heard the summary judgment motion de
novo. 39 After oral arguments concluded, Congress passed the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004.40 Within the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004 was Section 8121,
directing the Secretary of Interior to transfer the land on which the
cross was located to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Post. In return, the
Secretary of the Interior received a privately owned five-acre parcel of

2) it has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and 3) does not foster
excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13.
32. Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
33. Id.
34. 93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 1996).
35. Id. at 620 n.5, 618-19.
36. Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1217.
39. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 2004).
40. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub.L. No. 108-87, 117 Stat.
1054 (2003).
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land located in the Preserve. 41 Further, under Section 8121, the
Secretary of the Interior was instructed to continue carrying out his
duties under the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act.4 2
Lastly, Section 8121 provided that, if the "property is no longer being
maintained as43a war memorial," the property was to revert to the
United States.
In Buono II, the defendants appealed the judgment of Buono
,44 arguing that the presence of the cross on federal land did not
violate the Establishment Clause. 45 The Court of Appeals upheld the
district court decision, stating that the issue was "squarely controlled"
by City of Eugene.46 In doing so, the appellate court rejected the
defendants' argument that visibility and location of the Preserve cross,
in contrast with the City of Eugene cross, made their case
distinguishable.47 Instead, the court stated that "[n]ational parklands
and preserves embody the notion of government ownership as much as
urban parkland, and the remote location of the [Preserve rock] does
nothing to detract from that notion." 48 Additionally, the Court of
Appeals determined that a reasonable observer would know that the
land on which the cross sat was owned by the government; "given the
ratio of publicly-owned to privately-owned land in the Preserve ... a
less well-informed reasonable observer would
still believe-or at least
49
land."
public
on
rests
cross
the
suspect-that

41. Id.
42. Id.

43. Id.
44. Buono, 371 F.3d 543.
45. Id. at 548. The Court of Appeals also reconsidered Defendants' challenges to

Plaintiffs' standing, ultimately reaching the same conclusion as the District Court. Id. at 54547.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 549 ("That the [rock on which the cross sits] is not near a government building
is insignificant- neither was the [City of Eugene] cross. What is significant is that the
[Preserve] cross, like the [City of Eugene] cross, sits on public park land.").
48. Id.

49. Id. at 550. The court used Justice O'Connor's "reasonable observer" standard set
forth in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette: a reasonable observer "must be

deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious
display appears." Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780-81
(1995).
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C. Buono III
Following Buono II, Buono filed a motion to enforce or modify
the permanent injunction against the defendants.5 0 Because the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act called for the sale of the
public land containing the cross to private parties, Buono asked the
court to "either hold that the transfer violates the current injunction, or
modify that injunction to prohibit the land transfer because it violates
the Establishment Clause." 51 The court refused to delay its ruling
pending disposition of two Supreme Court cases, Van Orden v. Perry
and McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, stating:
[T]he issue here is not whether the display of the Latin
cross on federal land violates the Establishment
Clause ....Rather, the issue is whether the land
transfer directed by section 8121 violates the permanent
injunction or is itself an unconstitutional violation
of
52
Clause.
Establishment
Amendment
First
the
The court stated that, in the absence of unusual circumstances,
the government may end its endorsement of religion through sale of
the piece of property at issue. 53 In determining whether any unusual
circumstances were present in the land transfer, the court noted that
because of the reversionary clause in Section 8121, the government
retained control over the property. 54 Further, designating the cross a
memorial, erecting a plaque with government funds, and reaffirming
the Secretary of the Interior's duties under the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act indicated the government's intent to
preserve the cross, and remain actively involved with it. 55 The court
found that the transfer of the land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars
Post, an involved proponent of the maintenance of the cross, qualified
as an "unusual circumstances" exception.56 The court also noted that
the land transfer decision did not follow the usual administrative
50. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Plaintiff Schwartz
had died before the motion was filed. Id. at 1177 n.2.
51. Id. at 1177.
52. Id. at 1178. The court also refused to postpone ruling on the issue until the land
transfer was completed, as it was clear to the court that the land transfer would go forward. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d
487, 492 (7th Cir. 2000)).
54. Id. at 1180.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1180-81.
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process. Traditionally, the Secretary of the Interior retains the right to
make land transfers, but in this instance, the government itself made
the decision. 58 Lastly, the court categorized the government's efforts at
saving the cross as "herculean" and found that the complex history of
the case was itself an "unusual circumstance." 59 Therefore, the land
transfer violated the permanent injunction granted by the court in
Buono 1.60 The government appealed the disposition to the Ninth
Circuit. 6 1 Thus, the Ninth Circuit was called upon to determine
whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the
Section 8121 land exchange violated the court-ordered permanent
injunction against the presence and maintenance62 of a Latin cross on
federal land in Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution reads: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion. ' 63 Supreme Court
jurisprudence sets forth several tests to determine if an Establishment
Clause violation exists, including the Lemon test,64 whether a
governmental behavior endorses a particular religion, 65 or whether a
secular purpose behind government behavior predominates. 66 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the need to examine
context in deciding whether a particular religious6 7 symbol present on
public property violates the Establishment Clause.

57. Id. at 1181.
58. Id. The court noted that, although this fact was not determinative in itself, it lent
itself
to the conclusion that the government actively sought to evade the court-ordered injunction.
Id.
59. Id. at 1181-82.
60. Id. at 1182.
61. Buono v. Kempthome, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007).
62. Id. at 1071.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
64. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
65. See, e.g. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).
66. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
67. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573; McCreary,
545 U.S. 844; Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
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A. The Supreme CourtRelies on Context to Determine the
Constitutionalityof the Presence of Religious Symbols on Public
Property
1. The Importance of Context Revealed: Lynch v. Donnelly
Within the setting of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
examination of a symbol's context can involve investigating the
location of the religious symbol or the manner in which it is displayed.
In Lynch, the Supreme Court considered whether the Establishment
Clause barred a municipality's display of a creche, or Nativity scene,
as part of its Christmas display. 8 The City of Pawtucket, Rhode
Island's annual Christmas display included many traditional Christmas
figures, such as reindeer, a Christmas tree, colored lights, candystriped poles, and the creche. 69 The Lynch case arose when the Rhode
Island affiliate of the ACLU and its individual members brought suit
claiming that the inclusion of the creche in the display violated the
Establishment Clause.70
In considering the display's constitutionality, the Court stated
that the "Constitution [does not] require complete separation of church
and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any."71 The
Court noted that the three-prong Lemon test is often applied to
determine whether government behavior violates the Establishment
Clause. 72 However, the Court identified the context of the creche as
dispositive in its decision. 73 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the
district court committed an error in exclusively focusing on the creche,
instead of the context of the Christmas season. 74 Thus, the Supreme
Court found that any benefit to religion resulting from the cr~che's
display was "indirect, remote, or incidental. ' ' 75 Further, the complete
lack of evidence of political divisiveness over the creche in its forty-

68. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670-71.
69. Id. at 671.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 673.
72. Id. at 679 (stating the Lemon test as "whether the challenged law or conduct has a
secular purpose, whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion, and
whether it creates an excessive entanglement of government with religion.").
73. Id.
74. Id. at 680.
75. Id. at 683; Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. NyQuist, 413 U.S. 756,
771 (1973).
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year history indicated a lack of excessive governmental entanglement
with religion. 76
Justice O'Connor concurred in the result. 77 She identified the
need for an examination of "government endorsement or disapproval
of religion" to clarify the Lemon test.7 8 She explained, "[e]ndorsement
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community." 79 Justice O'Connor's method of determining whether a
religious symbol sends a message of endorsement is to scrutinize
"what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the
81
display," 80 considered in the context in which the symbol appears.
Here, the "overall holiday setting ' 82 as the relevant "particular
physical setting ' 83 indicated that a public holiday, rather than a
religious holiday, was being celebrated. 84 Like the majority, O'Connor
identified the fact that the display had caused no political divisiveness
prior to the present lawsuit as substantial evidence that it did
not
85
communicate a message of government endorsement of religion.
2. FurtherDeveloping a Context Test: Allegheny v. ACLU
In Allegheny v. ACLU, the Allegheny County courthouse
contained two holiday displays: a creche and a menorah. The creche,
located on the Grand Staircase within the courthouse, was topped with
an angel and a banner stating "Gloria in Excelsis Deo!, 8 7 The
menorah, displayed a block away and outside of the City-County
Building, sat next to a large Christmas tree. 88 A sign sitting at the base
of the tree 89
identified the mayor's name and declared the city's "salute
liberty."
to

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684-85.
Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 689.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 692.

81. Id.
82. Id.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 693.
86. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578 (1989).
87. Id. at 580. "Gloria in Excelsis Deo!, " means "Glory to God in the highest...

at 580 n.5.
88. Id. at 581-82.
89. Id. at 582.

Id.
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Considering the creche's setting, standing alone, within the
main part of a building that served as the "seat of county
government, '9°
the
Court
concluded
the
display
was
unconstitutional. 91 The Court cited with approval Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Lynch, 92 whose test "turns upon the context in which
the contested object appears." 93 The Alleghany decision relied upon
whether the creche and menorah, "in their respective particular
physical settings," endorses or suppresses religious beliefs. 9 Nothing
counteracted the display's sectarian message, because the creche stood
alone. 95 In light of its context, the creche represented governmental
observance of Christmas "as a Christian holiday" as opposed to an
observance of Christmas as a "cultural phenomenon, ' 96 and thus was
considered unconstitutional.
In contrast to the creche, the Court stated that the determination
of constitutionality of the menorah's location "may well present a
closer constitutional question." 97 Because the County displayed the
menorah along with a sign and a Christmas tree, the Court concluded
that the message received by viewers was of the state's recognition of
Christmas and Chanukah as secular holidays, rather than an
endorsement of particular religions. 98 The Court also noted that,
"[w]hile no sign can disclaim an overwhelming message of
endorsement, an 'explanatory plaque' may confirm that in particular
contexts the government's association with a religious symbol does
not represent the government's sponsorship of religious beliefs." 99
Thus, the Court found the display
of the menorah, given its context, to
00
be constitutionally permissible.

90. Id. at 599.
91. Id. at 602.
92. Id. at 595 ("Although Justice O'Connor joined the majority opinion in Lynch, she
wrote a concurrence that differs in significant respects from the majority opinion. The main
difference is that the concurrence provides a sound analytical framework for evaluating
governmental use of religious symbols.").
93. Id.
94. Id. at 597.
95. Id. at 598.
96. Id. at 601.
97. Id. at 613.
98. Id. at 616.
99. Id. at 619 (internal citations omitted).
100. Id. at 621.
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3. Application of the Context Test Following Lynch and
Allegheny
Subsequent cases in federal courts of appeals have clarified the
tests set forth in Allegheny and O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch. For
example, in Doe v. City of Clawson, a private party challenged the
presence of a creche among secular Christmas symbols on the front
lawn of City Hall in Clawson, Michigan. 01 In light of the pending
Supreme Court decision in Allegheny, the district court issued a
stay. 10 2 Following the Supreme Court's decision, the district court
plaintiff then appealed
granted summary judgment to the City. 103 The
10 4
to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
In light of Allegheny, the court found three factors dispositive
when considering whether governmental endorsement exists: context,
composition, and location. 105 The court in Doe determined that: 1) the
Christmas holiday season constitutes the context of a challenged
creche; 2) the figures and objects displayed along with the creche
make up its composition; and 3) the site upon which the creche is
displayed represents its location. 06 The court then concluded that the
display of the creche at issue was constitutional. 10 7 Because the City
10 8 a "message
symbol,
it conveyed
placed the creche along with a secular of
Christianity.
endorsement
an
not
and
of pluralism"
Similarly, in Murray v. City of Austin, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit examined the issue of context in determining the
constitutionality of a city insignia, which was used on city vehicles,
bills, uniforms, buildings, and letterhead, that contained a Latin
cross. 109 The court considered:
Austin did not have an improper purpose in adopting
the insignia; its long and unchallenged use; its nonproselytizing effect; that in its context, it does not
endorse religion in any true or meaningful sense of the
word 'endorsement'; and that requiring the City to

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Doe v. City of Clawson, 915 F.2d 244, 245 (6th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 249.
Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 149-50 (5th Cir. 1991).
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remove all displays of the insignia, arguably evinces
not neutrality, but instead hostility, to religion. 110
As a result, the court determined that no Establishment Clause
violation existed."' Thus, the court identified the history of a
particular religious1 12symbol as a factor for courts to consider when
examining context.

4. Recent Developments: McCreary County v. ACLU and Van
Orden v. Perry
The Court has recently emphasized the importance of context
in its seminal cases involving replicas of the Ten Commandments:
McCreary County v. ACLU'1 3 and Van Orden v. Perry.114 In
McCreary, the courthouse in McCreary County, Kentucky hung large
Upon suit by the ACLU, the
copies of the Ten Commandments.'
County expanded its display, including a copy of a resolution
identifying the Ten Commandments as "the precedent legal code upon
' 16
which the civil and criminal codes of ...Kentucky are founded." "
Ultimately, the district court ordered the County to remove the
display.' The County responded by hanging additional documents,
such as the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, and the
8
lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner, beside the Ten Commandments."
Justice Souter, writing the opinion of the Court, held that a
secular purpose must predominate for a display to be held
constitutional under the Establishment Clause, with the outcome of the
case turning on the governmental purpose behind the erection of a
particular display."19 Souter emphasized that "the eyes that look to
purpose belong to an 'objective observer,' one who takes account of
the traditional external signs that show up in the 'text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute, or comparable official
act."' 120 Indeed, purpose is understood "in light of context."' 2' Prior to
110. Id.at 158.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 156. The court distinguished the case at bar from a Seventh Circuit case,
Harris v. City of Zion, in part because the insignia adopted by the City of Zion, containing
religious symbols, "was adopted for an express religious purpose." Id. at 157.
113. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
114. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
115. McCreary,545 U.S. at 851.
116. Id. at 853.
117. Id. at 855.
118. Id. at 856.
119. Id. at 861.
120. Id. at 862 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)).
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any litigation, the County's first display of the Ten Commandments
stood alone, undermining any argument of sectarian purpose. 22 Justice
Souter stated, "[w]hen the government initiates an effort to place this
' 123
statement alone in public view, a religious object is unmistakable."
Further, the Court noted that the second display's "unstinting focus"
was on religion. 124 In light of the previous displays, the Court found it
entirely unreasonable that an objective observer would believe the
County's claims that it had suddenly abandoned its religious purpose
by the time of its third display.' 25 Lastly, the Court noted that a display
within its own courtroom depicting Moses with a copy of the Ten
Commandments was distinguishable from the McCreary County
display. 126 The Supreme Court display contains the secular
Commandments only, and Moses stands "in the company of seventeen
other lawgivers, most of them secular figures . ,127 It is therefore
unlikely that a reasonable observer, viewing the context of the display,
would discern a religious purpose. 28
In contrast, in Van Orden v. Perry, the Court found a religious
symbol identical to the one at issue in McCreary to be constitutional.
In Van Orden, the grounds surrounding the Texas State Capitol
1 29
contained various markers allegedly commemorating Texas history.
Among the markers was a six-foot-high monument of the Ten
Commandments.130 The Court noted that, although it must recognize
and maintain a separation between church and state, it need not act
with hostility towards religion or require the government never to
recognize the Nation's religious heritage.' 3 1 The location of the Ten
Commandments monument in this case constituted a "far more passive
use" than other displays of the Ten Commandments.'
Further, the
inclusion of the Ten Commandments within a group of other
monuments indicated that the display held both a religious and secular

121. Id. at 874.
122. Id. at 868-69.
123. Id. at 869.

124. Id. at 870.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 872-73.
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id.

129. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 683-84.
132. Id. at 691.
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determined that the display did not
significance. 133 The Court therefore
34
violate the Establishment Clause.'
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, acknowledging the
importance of context in determining the constitutionality of a
challenged religious symbol. 135 In addition, he stressed the fact that the
monument's presence caused no litigation for 40 years.136 To Breyer,
"those [forty] years suggest more strongly than can any set of
formulaic tests" that visitors to the State Capitol consider the religious
' 37
portion of the tablets as indicative of a broader "cultural heritage."'
Breyer also emphasized that the history behind the monument, unlike

in McCrear, did not indicate a clear governmental religious
motivation. 1 8
Thus, Supreme Court and lower court precedent has
consistently recognized the need to examine context when weighing a
religious symbol's constitutionality, considering factors such as the
symbol's location, the manner in which it is displayed, and its relation
to surrounding symbols, if any.139 In addition, courts have given.
weight to the symbol's purpose as apparent to a reasonable observer,
and the length of its unchallenged existence. 140
B. The Ninth CircuitPreviously Evinced an Unwillingness to Weigh
Context In Determiningthe ConstitutionalityofReligious Displays
14 1
In Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene,
the Ninth Circuit did not examine context when adjudicating the claim
of an Establishment Clause violation. At issue in City of Eugene was a
fifty-one foot Latin cross placed by private individuals within a public
park.142 Almost immediately, litigation ensued.143 In response, the

133. Id. at 691-92.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 701 ("In certain contexts, a display of the tablets of the Ten Commandments
can convey not simply a religious message but also a secular moral message (about proper
standards of social conduct). And in certain contexts, a display of the tablets can also convey a
historical message (about a historic relation between those standards and the law) -a fact that
helps to explain the display of those tablets in dozens of courthouses throughout the Nation,
including the Supreme Court of the United States.").
136. Id. at 702.
137. Id. at 702-03.
138. Id. at 703.
139. See discussion supra Part Il.A.
140. See discussion supra Part II.A.
141. Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir.
1996). See also supra notes 33-38.
142. Id. at618.
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voters of the city approved an amendment to the City Charter, naming
the cross a war memorial.144 Further, the City placed a plaque at the
base of the cross, dedicating the cross to war veterans. 145 Nonetheless,
the Ninth Circuit declared that the presence of the cross "clearly
represents governmental endorsement of Christianity." 146 It
emphasized that, regardless of how a particular religious symbol may
be characterized, the only real issue is how the symbol is reasonably
perceived. 147 It concluded that "there [was] no question that the Latin
cross is a symbol of Christianity.
48
was unconstitutional. 1

.

. " and its presence on public land

Judge O'Scannlain concurred in the result, asserting that,
although the court was ultimately correct in the disposition of the case,
it failed sufficiently to address the complexity of the issue or apply the
correct legal standard. 149 In his view, Allegheny required the court to
engage in a more meticulous scrutiny of the context of the display than
it did, specifically analyzing "the cross' historical significance as an
officially-designated war memorial."' 150 He believed that the presence
of a plaque identifying the cross as a war memorial along with the
setting of the cross supported an argument for constitutionality; the
cross sat in isolation away from government structures, and therefore,
it was plausible that the public would not make a connection between
the symbol and government. 151 Nonetheless, O'Scannlain ultimately
concluded that observers could indeed reasonably perceive the
presence of the cross on public land as constituting government
endorsement of religion. 152 Therefore,
the court found that the cross
153
Clause.
Establishment
the
violated

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 619.
Id.
Id. at 620.
Id. (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
Id. at 624.
Id. at625-26.
Id. 626.
Id.
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C. Once Land is Sold, Courts Must Apply an "Unusual
Circumstances" Test to Determine the Existence of an Establishment
Clause Violation
Although the presence of a religious symbol on public property
is a focal point of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the validity of
sale of public land containing a religious symbol is also a matter
falling within the ambits of the Establishment Clause. In Mercier v.
Fraternal Order of Eagles, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit considered the constitutionality of a monument of the Ten
54
Commandments sitting in a public park in La Crosse, Wisconsin.
Although its presence did not raise any problems for twenty years, in
2001, the Freedom from Religion Foundation asked the City to remove
the monument. 155 To resolve the issue, the City eventually decided to
sell the land on which the monument sat to the Fraternal Order of
Eagles, the group which had originally placed the monument in the
park. 156 Once sold, the Fraternal Order of Eagles erected a fence
157
around the monument and hung a private property sign.
Nonetheless, the Freedom from Religion Foundation challenged the
sale as constituting an impermissible Establishment Clause
violation. 158
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the sale of land was not an
independent Establishment Clause violation. 159 The court noted that,
"absent unusual circumstances, a sale of real property is an effective
way for a public body to end its inappropriate endorsement of
religion."' 160 Indeed, it is the charge of a court addressing an allegation
of unconstitutionality to look at the substance of the sale in addition to
its form to determine whether government endorsement of religion
remains. 16 1 The court identified actions that would undermine the
legitimacy of a sale:
a sale that did not comply with applicable state law
governing the sale of land by a municipality; a sale to a
straw purchaser that left the City with continuing power
154. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2005).
155. Id.at 696.
156. Id. at 696-97.
157. Id. at 697-98.
158. Id.at 698.
159. Id. at 705.
160. Id. at 700 (quoting Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203
F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2000)).
161. Id.

2008]

A CROSS TO BEAR

393

to exercise the duties of ownership; or a sale well below
fair market value resulting in a gift to a religious
organization. 162

None of these factors were present in Mercier. 63 Additionally,
the Mercier court stated that the location of the monument was
noteworthy because the land was not located near a government
building and it was not in a particularly prominent location within the
park. 16f Lastly, the court noted the "somewhat extensive efforts" the
Fraternal Order of Eagles took to identify the land as private
property.' 16516
Thus, the sale was deemed constitutional. 66
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
applied the unusual circumstances test in weighing the validity of a
land sale. 167 In Chambers v. City of Frederick, a public memorial
ground contained a copy of the Ten Commandments. 168 In response to
litigation threatened'by the ACLU, the city voted to sell the monument
and the land on which it sat.' 69 Nonetheless, the ACLU brought suit,
alleging that the sale constituted a sham transaction.' 70 In adjudicating
the issue, the district court adopted the unusual circumstances test as
set forth by the Seventh Circuit and ultimately concluded that there
171
was no evidence of unusual circumstances behind the transaction.
Further, to determine whether the sale constituted an endorsement of
religion, the court applied the Lemon test.' 72 The court held that a
government's own characterization of the purpose behind its actions is
entitled to deference, and here there was no evidence that the city's
alleged secular purpose was insincere.1 73 In addition, the court stated
that a reasonable observer familiar with the history behind the
monument would not believe that the government was endorsing a
religious message, but instead would acknowledge that the sale was an

162. Id. at 702 (internal citation omitted).
163. Id.

164. Id. at 703.
165. Id. at 703-04.
166. Id. at 704.
167. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2005).
168. Id. at 569-70.
169. Id. at 570.
170. Id. at 571. The ACLU alleged that the sale was suspect because the purchaser's bid
was lower than other bidders'. Id. at 572.
171. Id.
172. Id.

173. Id. at 573.
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attempt to remove a government association with a religious
symbol.174 The court therefore found the sale to be constitutional. 171
III. THE COURT'S REASONING

In Buono II, The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did
not err in concluding that the land transfer violated the permanent
injunction granted by the trial court, and that the government violated
the Establishment Clause through continued endorsement of a
particular religion. The court also found that the land transfer under
Section 8121 was invalid because the various government statutes that
were enacted indicated continued government oversight and control of
the cross.177 Through Section 8121, the National Park Service retained
supervisory and management obligations over the property, and the
reversionary clause within Section 8121 ensured that the government
would receive the property in the event it was not used as a "war
memorial," which the court noted meant the cross itself. 78
1 Further, the
Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the district court's conclusion that the method
used to effectuate the land exchange was suspect. 179 Not only was the
land exchange made by Congress, but Congress did not even have a
hearing before enacting the land transfer and did not provide for open
bidding. 180 In addition, the government-selected beneficiaries of the
transfer had a personal interest in preserving the cross. 18 1 The court
noted that the government's history of attempting to preserve the cross
comported with a similar government interest. 182
Lastly, the court touched on the First Amendment issue of the
presence of a religious symbol on federal land and concluded that the
cross' presence did indeed violate the Establishment Clause.' 83 It
stated that a reasonable observer charged with knowledge of the
history of the cross "would know of the government's attempts to
preserve it and the denial of access to other religious symbols."' 1 4 The
court further asserted that even if a person did not have knowledge of
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Buono v. Kempthome, 502 F.3d 1069, 1081-86 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1082-83.
Id. at 1083-84.
Id. at 1084-85.
Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1085.

182. Id.

183. Id. at 1086.
184. Id.
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the cross' history, he or she would still view the presence of the cross
as a government endorsement of religion85because preserves are widely
associated with government ownership.'
IV. ANALYSIS
In Buono v. Kempthorne, the Ninth Circuit held that the
government's transfer of land containing a religious symbol to private
hands violated the Establishment Clause because the government
retained supervisory control over the land. 186 Further, the history of the
cross indicated a strong governmental interest in endorsing a particular
religion. 87 Although the court's final adjudication of the land transfer
issue was correct, 88 the court failed sufficiently to weigh context in its
consideration of the constitutionality of the presence of a cross on
federal land. 189 Had the court followed Supreme Court jurisprudence
more carefully, the string of government responses to the disposition
of the original case could have been avoided. 9 Indeed, by steadfastly
refusing to weigh context, the four courts that considered the Buono
issue exuded the appearance of partiality, denied the parties a fair trial,
and may have contributed to unnecessary additional litigation.' 9 1 To
avoid such a result, the Buono courts should have more carefully
considered
the history of the cross, its location, and its manner of
92
display. 1

A. The Ninth Circuit did not Adequately Examine Context in its
Determination of the Constitutionalityof the Presenceof the Cross
within the Preserve
1. A Closer Examination of Context was Necessary in Order to
Avoid Evincing Hostility Towards Religion
The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the
importance of context in determining the constitutionality of religious

185. Id.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 1082-85.
Id. at 1085.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part W.A.
Id.
Id.

192. Id.
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symbols on public land. 193 In the benchmark Lynch and Allegheny
cases, the location of the religious symbols and the manner in which
they were displayed were necessary dispositive contextual issues,
requiring fact-specific inquiries.' 94 In Allegheny, "the Supreme Court
outlined a methodology and a standard for lower courts to follow,
rather than a bright-line rule of decision-making."' 95 The Court found
the menorah displayed alongside a Christmas tree was constitutionally
sound, although the creche standing alone was not.' 96 In the Buono
case, the cross stood alone, much like the creche in Allegheny, with
nothing to offset its religious meaning. 197 However, unlike that creche,
the cross was nowhere near a government building, instead sitting in
the middle of a desert. 198 Under Supreme Court precedent, the Buono
courts were charged with the responsibility of engaging in a factspecific 1 examination
of the particular cross at hand, considering its
99
context.

Both the Lynch and Van Orden Courts acknowledged a
religious symbol can take on a constitutionally appropriate "passive
use." 200 The Establishment Clause ensures "that the government [does]
not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise
by force of law or threat of penalty., 20 '1 The cross' remote and isolated
193. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989); McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
194. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-600, 620.
195. Lior J. Strahilevitz, This is not a Criche, 107 YALE L.J. 1969, 1970 (1997).
196. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-600, 620.
197. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
198. Id. at 1204.
199. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602, 617-18 (finding that a creche, standing alone,
was unconstitutional, while a nearby menorah, displayed along with a secular symbol and a
sign, was not unconstitutional).
200. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) ("The creche, like a painting, is
passive...."); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691 (2005) ("The placement of the Ten
Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds is a far more passive use of
those texts than was the case in Stone [v. Graham], where the text confronted elementary
school students every day.") Although the decision in Van Orden came after the first two
Buono decisions, Van Orden and McCreary could have been given deference in the later
Buono cases. Other federal courts have issued stays when dispositive issues were before the
Supreme Court. See Doe v. City of Clawson, 915 F.2d 244, 246 (6th Cir. 1990). Instead, the
Buono III court denied the defendants' request to delay its ruling until McCreary and Van
Orden were decided, stating that the cases were "inapposite" to the issue at bar because it had
already been determined that the cross violated the Establishment Clause. Buono v. Norton,
364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-78 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
201. Trisha A. Vicario, Religious Monuments under Attack: Undermining Religion for
the Benefit of the Irreligious in Books v. City of Elkhart, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 151, 187
(2001). Several Supreme Court Justices support the view that the Establishment Clause only
protects against coerced religious behavior. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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location supports a finding that the cross did not confront citizens of
California every day in an egregious manner nor coerce them into
religious practice, instead playing a passive role in any promotion of
religion. 2G2 By failing to examine the impact of the "particular physical
setting ' 2° 3 of the cross, the Buono courts committed error. Instead,
they "conclude[d] that the size of a cross and the number of people
who view it are not important for deciding whether a reasonable
observer would perceive the cross located on federal land as
government endorsement or disapproval of religion." 20 4 However,
where a symbol results in "indirect, remote, or incidental" benefit to
religion, as existed
in the case at bar, a court should find its presence to
20 5
be constitutional.

Additionally, it is notable that the Allegheny 20 6 Court did not
find that the creche and menorah's display in the heart of county
government, within or next to clearly identifiable government
buildings, was in itself indicative of unconstitutionality.2 0 From this
holding, one may conclude that a religious symbol is not automatically
unconstitutional when it is present in a clearly demarcated government
building. 20 8 As such, the Ninth Circuit should not conclusively deem a
religious symbol sitting nowhere near a government building
unconstitutional simply because of its presence on federal land.20
Notably, the two courts that were in the best position to consider the
Establishment Clause issue, when the government had not yet sold the
land on which the cross sat, addressed it very little in their
21
argument.
The Buono
court's
of of
the itsEstablishment
Clause issue took
up onlyI three
anddiscussion
a half pages
fifteen page

202. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691 (describing the "passive" location of the Ten

Commandments monument at issue).
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
failed to

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O.Connor, J., concurring).
Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2dat 1216.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683 (internal citation omitted).
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
See Vicario, supra note 201, at 181 ("What the [Books v. City of Elkhart] court
consider was that Supreme Court precedent does not dictate that religious symbols

located near city buildings are unconstitutional. Rather, the Supreme Court has stated that the
constitutionality of a city or state's display depends on the context of the display to determine

whether it detracts from the display's religious message.").
208. See generally, Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573.
209. Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1216 ("[T]he cross is on federal land, and the court

concludes from the uncontroverted material facts that a reasonable observer would believe that
such land and the cross are owned by the government.").
210. By the time of Buono III, the constitutionality of the land transfer became the
forefront issue in the case. See Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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opinion, 21 1 while the Buono II court's entire opinion spanned only
seven pages, with three devoted to the Establishment Clause. 2 12 As
Judge O'Scannlain noted in his concurrence in City of Eugene, the
issue of constitutionality of religious symbols on public property
deserves a more searching examination than what was given.
Despite a cross' inherently religious nature, its display on
government land is not per se unconstitutional.214 In fact, had private
citizens erected the display in a public forum instead of in the
Preserve, its presence would have been per se constitutional. 215 Of
immense importance is the fact that the Supreme Court has explicitly
directed that the Establishment Clause mandates accommodation and
bars hostility towards religion. 21 6 As the Fifth Circuit recognized,
requiring a municipality to remove its challenged religious symbol can
indicate an impermissible hostility, rather than neutrality, towards that
religion, when its context does not warrant removal.2 7 Courts must
therefore be careful to weigh all dispositive contextual considerations
surrounding a religious symbol in order to avoid an appearance of
hostility towards that religion.
Further, the Establishment Clause's mandate of separation of
church and state 218 means that the State may not create a national
21
church. 21
Such an institutional separation does not contemplate a

211. See Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1214-17.
212. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 548-50 (9th Cir. 2004).
213. Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 620 (9th Cir.
1996) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
214. Joshua D. Zarrow, Of Crosses and Crches. The Establishment Clause and Publicly
Sponsored Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 477, 492 nn. 92-93 (1985)
(citing cases in which the display of crosses on public land has been held not to violate the
Establishment Clause).
215. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he right to use government property for one's
private expression depends upon whether the property has by law or tradition been given the
status of a public forum, or rather has been reserved for specific official uses. If the former, a
State's right to limit protected expressive activity is sharply circumscribed: It may impose
reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.., but it may regulate
expressive content only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a
compelling state interest." Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995)
(internal citations omitted). Thus, when religious expression is "1) purely private and 2)
occurs in a traditional and designated public forum," that expression does not violate the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 770.
216. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
217. See Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 158 (5th Cir. 1991).
218. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
219. Andrew R. Cogar, Government Hostility to Religion: How Misconstruction of the
Establishment Clause Stifles Religious Freedom, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 279, 286 (2002). For a
discussion contrasting Thomas Jefferson's view that the Establishment Clause implies "a wall
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complete ban on all public religious expression, 22 which would in fact
favor irreligion over religion. Quite the contrary, "the Establishment
Clause insulates religious groups from government hostility by
preventing the federal government from engaging in sectarian
favoritism. 222 As such, courts are required to engage in "benevolent
neutrality" when judging religious issues.22 3 Under a charge of
benevolent neutrality, no court could constitutionally exhibit bias in
favor of those who opposed the presence of the cross in the Preserve,
over those private citizens who placed the cross in the Preserve and
favored its maintenance.224 At the very least, the Supreme Court's
admonition against hostility towards religion means a fair day in court
for all parties, both religious and non-religious.
Although certainly not controlling, the fact that citizens of the
225
cross
surrounding area strongly supported maintenance of the

should have brought pause to the Buono courts. 226 The Supreme Court
once stated that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being., 227 Indeed, "two thirds of [American]
citizens consider their religious beliefs 'very important' . . . [and] at
least ninety percent of Americans profess a belief in God." 22 8 By
issuing conclusory opinions without considering context, the Buono

of separation between church and State" to James Madison's view that the Clause takes away
the state's power to create a national church, see Vicario, supra note 201, at 162-64.
220. Cogar, supra note 219, at 285 ("[T]he Founders and the First Congress agreed that
religion not only must be vigorously protected, but also should play an integral role in public
life"); id. at 287-88 ("[T]he strict separationist doctrine contravenes the purpose of the
Religion Clauses in that it serves to exclude religion from 'public life and discourse'-a
notion that undoubtedly would appall the Founding Fathers") (internal citations omitted).
221. See Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 275 (4th Cir. 2001) ("This authorized, and
sometimes mandatory, accommodation of religion is a necessary aspect of the Establishment
Clause jurisprudence because, without it, government would find itself effectively and
unconstitutionally promoting the absence of religion over its practice.") (internal citation
omitted). See also Vicario, supra note 201, at 173 (arguing that, by denying the right of the
religious to adorn a public lawn with a monument of the Ten Commandments, the 7th Circuit
in fact expanded the rights of the irreligious).
222. Cogar, supra note 219, at 284.
223. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
224. Id. (stating a requirement that a court engage in "benevolent neutrality").
225. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1206 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
226. The First Amendment is certainly not a majoritarian provision, in which the desires
or beliefs of a majority override minority beliefs in society. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit was
required to give equal consideration to both arguments, especially considering the public and
political fervor in support of the cross' maintenance.
227. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
228. Cogar, supra note 219, at 280.
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courts 229 gave insufficient weight and respect to these beliefs. 23 ° Thus,
these courts denied the citizens affected by the Buono litigation the
benefit of a well-thought-out decision, reaffirming the Ninth Circuit's
23
reputation of hostility towards religion. '
2. The Ninth Circuit Should Have Given the Pre-Litigation
History of the Cross More Weight
The Supreme Court and at least one lower federal court
identified another contextual consideration when determining the
constitutionality of a religious symbol on public land: the history
behind the particular religious monument or symbol itself. For
example, the Lynch court cited the fact that the creche at issue had
caused no political dissention in its forty year history prior to the
litigation as evidence that no "excessive entanglement" with religion
existed.2 32 The Fifth Circuit stated that lack of evidence of a city's
improper purpose in adopting an insignia and the "long and
unchallenged use" of that insignia are reasons to deny allegations of an
Establishment Clause violation. 23 3 Additionally, Justice Breyer noted
in his concurrence in Van Orden that the amount of time a religious
symbol remains unchallenged
by the public is in itself indicative of its
234
constitutionality.
In the Buono litigation, private citizens erected the cross at
issue in 1934; it faced its first legal challenge in 1999.235 Thus, the
229. The author believes that each of the four courts dealing with the Buono litigation had
the responsibility to consider the Establishment Clause issue diligently, regardless of its
standard of review.
230. See Vicario, supra note 201, at 188 ("When the Books court determined that the Ten
Commandments Monument was unconstitutional, the court was not determining whether
reasonable objective viewers would understand the display to be an endorsement of religion
but allowing hostility toward religion because the majority of Elkhart citizens did not want to
remove the display of the Ten Commandments Monument from the lawn of the city's
Municipal Building.").
231. See, e.g., Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine
Amendments: Origins,Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
551, 617 (2003) (describing the Ninth Circuit as "no friend to religion in the public sphere").
232. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). See also id. at 693 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
233. Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 158 (5th Cir. 1991).
234. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702-03 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring). Although
the decisions in Van Orden and McCreary came after the first two Buono decisions, their
focus on context existed in case law prior to Buono I, in Lynch, Allegheny, and several federal
cases.
235. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Indeed, in contrast
to cases such as Lynch and McCreary, the government played no part in the inception or
placement of the religious symbol on public land. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671 ("Each year, in
cooperation with the downtown retail merchants' association, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode
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cross experienced a "calm history" 236 for over sixty years before any
challenge to its constitutionality was made. Under O'Connor's
endorsement test adopted by the Court in Allegheny, how a reasonable
237
observer perceives the symbol indicates the effect of such a display.
The lack of challenge to the Buono display for so many years indicates
that an average observer probably did not, and would not, view the
cross to be constitutionally offensive.238 Such a lack of a challenge
distinguishes the Buono cross from the cross at issue in City of
Eugene, the case that controlled the outcome of the Buono
Establishment Clause issue.24239
There, the cross' presence resulted in
0
almost immediate litigation.
Further, under Supreme Court precedent, how a reasonable
24 1
observer perceives the display is important in determining its effect.
The Supreme Court stated that a reasonable observer is "aware of the
history and context of the community and forum in which the religious
display appears. '' 242 Therefore, a reasonable observer of the Buono
cross would know that private parties, not the government, established
the Preserve cross,
decreasing an appearance of impropriety.
Additionally, a reasonable observer would know that the cross'
244
purpose was to memorialize war veterans, not promote religion.
Thus, such a reasonable observer would likely find no government
endorsement of religion.
Moreover, "sectarian symbols that have become linked to
independent historical events may survive an Establishment Clause
attack., 245 Although not a single, isolated historical event, private
citizens' use of the cross as a tribute to war veterans-a use that
Island, erects a Christmas display as part of its observance of the Christmas holiday season.");
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005) ("Executives of two counties

posted a version of the Ten Commandments on the walls of their courthouses.").
236. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684 (majority opinion).

237. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
595 (1989).
238. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702-03 (Breyer, J., concurring).
239. See, e.g., Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2004).
240. Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 618 (9th Cir.

1996).
241. See., e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
242. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1989); accord
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005).
243. Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
244. Id.
245. Jason Marques, To Bear a Cross: The Establishment Clause, HistoricPreservation,
and Eminent Domain Intersect at the Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial, 59 FLA. L. REv. 829,

857 (2007).
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occurred over a span of sixty-five years- 246 supports a finding that
the cross had independent secular significance. A sign accompanying
the cross, which existed for many years and identified the symbol as a
memorial to veterans, further emphasized the cross' independent
significance and informed a reasonable observer of its non-religious
purpose.247 The Supreme Court has stated, "[w]hile no sign can
disclaim an overwhelming message of endorsement, an 'explanatory
plaque' may confirm that, in particular contexts, the government's
association with a religious symbol does not represent the
government's sponsorship of religious beliefs., 248 Further, the
concurrence in City of Eugene noted that designating a symbol as a
war memorial could affect a reasonable observer's interpretation of the
government's purpose. 24 9 Thus, the Ninth Circuit should have
considered the constitutional effect of the plaque, now
removed, that
250
identified the Buono cross as a memorial to veterans.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit was not limited in fashioning a
tailored remedy for the cross' perceived impermissible religious effect.
As the McCreary Court recognized by contrasting the Court's own
replica of the Ten Commandments to the McCreary County replica,
the difference between a constitutional and unconstitutional display of
the same monument can simply be a matter of how the monument is
displayed, including what surrounds the monument.Z51 The
252
replacement of a prominent sign identifying the purpose of the cross
or the addition of other monuments around it identifying the area as a
memorial to veterans could have offset a seemingly religious
message. 253 The Buono I court was the court best positioned to
consider these alternatives, as the government had yet to engage in
extensive efforts to protect the cross and thus remove its appearance of

246. Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.

247. Id.
248. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 619 (1989).
249. Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 625 (9th Cir.
1996) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
250. See infra notes 251 and 252.
251. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 874 (2005). Although McCreary

was an antecedent to the first two Buono cases, the concept of an "explanatory plaque" being
used to clarify the source of a particular symbol has existed since Allegheny. See supra notes
240-244 and accompanying text.
252. For example, the Allegheny Court found a sign next to the challenged menorah to be
persuasive evidence of constitutionality. Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573, 616.
253. For example, in Van Orden, the fact that the Ten Commandments sat among other
secular monuments highlighted the Ten Commandments' secular importance. Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691-92 (2005).
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impartiality.. 54 However, this court failed to consider any viable ways
to ensure the cross' constitutionality, including recent legislation
designating the cross a war memorial. 255 Instead, it unwaveringly
concluded that the cross' presence was unconstitutional, relegating
discussion of the war memorial designation to a footnote.1 5 Such a
conclusory opinion may have fueled the flames, causing angry
2 7
supporters of the cross to undertake extensive efforts to maintain it. 3
3. The Precedent on Which the Buono Courts Relied Was
Flawed, CreatingPrecedentThat Permits the Ninth Circuit
to Overlook Context
In adjudicating the original issue of the presence of a religious
symbol on public land, the Buono courts relied heavily on City of
Eugene.258 However, that precedent also failed adequately to consider
the importance of context in Establishment Clause issues. There, the
court concluded that, because a Latin cross is a symbol of Christianity,
it was likely that a reasonable observer would perceive the cross as
government endorsement of religion. 259 However, the court did not
consider the symbol's history, its location, or the manner of its
display.26° In so doing, it established precedent enabling future courts
to overlook the importance of contextual factors in Establishment
Clause cases. Indeed, the concurrence in City of Eugene condemned
the majority's cursory examination of the issue and stated that the
people of Eugene were owed a "better explanation" of the extensive
litigation behind the cross. 26 1 As Judge O'Scannlain noted, the history
of a monument as a war memorial, a plaque identifying the monument
as such, and the isolated location262of a monument were all issues that
were overlooked by the majority.

254. In contrast, it was McCreary County's repeated efforts to "save" its Ten
Commandments monuments that led the Court to conclude that it could not have a secular
purpose. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 872.
255. Pub. L. No. 107-117 § 8137, 115 Stat. 2278-79 (2002), codified at 16 U.S.C.
§410aaa-56.
256. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1215 n.8, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
257. Indeed, "[t]he [National Park Service] was informed during contacts with local
citizens that immediately removing the cross could lead to significant public opposition. The
NPS had encountered considerable public opposition to earlier decisions to remove privatelyowned items interfering with its management of the Preserve." Id. at 1206.
258. Id. at 1215-17; Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 548 (2004).
259. Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 619 (9th Cir.
1996).
260. See supra Part II.A.
261. City ofEugene, 93 F.3d at 620 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
262. Id. at 624-26.
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It may be that, as Judge O'Scannlain ultimately concluded in
City of Eugene,263 the presence of the Buono cross on federal land
violated the Establishment Clause, giving the impression of
governmental endorsement of religion. However, the Ninth Circuit, a
circuit renowned for its liberal opinions, 264 condemned the cross too
quickly. 2 65 The Supreme Court cautions against evincing hostility
towards religion. 266 One may speculate that the outcome of the original
case might have been different had the court truly considered the
importance of context properly. It is further possible that the
defendants would not have gone to such great lengths to preserve the
cross at all had they felt that the court gave a legitimate and sound
reason for rejecting their claims. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit should
have avoided acting hastily, instead weighing both arguments more
evenly.
B. Once the Validity of the Land Transfer Became the Issue, the Ninth
CircuitEngaged in ProperDispositionof the Case by Correctly
Applying the Unusual CircumstancesTest
Whether the Ninth Circuit correctly dealt with the issue of
whether the presence of the cross on federal land violated the
Establishment Clause is a close question, one to which the Ninth
Circuit did not give enough consideration.267 However, the issue
changed once the government made the decision to sell the challenged
land to a private party, 268 and the Ninth Circuit properly found the sale
to be unconstitutional.269
Case law indicates that land transfers used to avoid
Establishment Clause violations are presumptively constitutionally
valid. 270 Indeed, "absent unusual circumstances," government bodies
accused of impermissibly endorsing a religious message may dispose
of a challenged religious symbol, and the land on which it sits, through
.

263. Id. at 626.
264. See Tara Dahl, Surveys in America's Classrooms: How Much Do Parents Really
Know?, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 143, 183 n.306 (2008)-(describing the Ninth Circuit as "the most

notoriously liberal and most overruled circuit in the nation") (citing Chisun Lee, Political
Prisoners,VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 19, 2004, at 27).
265. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
266. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
267. See supra Part IVA.

268. Pub.L. No. 108-87, 117 Stat. 1054 (2003).
269. Buono v. Kempthome, 502 F.3d 1069, 1082-86 (9th Cir. 2007).
270. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005);
Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2005).
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a land transfer. 27 1 However, a sale to a straw purchaser that leaves real
control in the hands of the government seller is an unusual
272
circumstance that equates to an Establishment Clause violation.
Although the transferred land was in an isolated location,
weighing in favor of constitutionality, 273 the history of the legislation
behind the land transfer weighed heavily against it. 2 74 As the facts of
the Buono case evidence, the government willingly entered into
precarious Establishment Clause waters in order to preserve the cross,
destroying any appearance of its impartiality. 275 A reversionary clause
within the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004,
identifying the cross as a war memorial, left open the possibility that
27 6
the government could regain control of the symbol in the future.
Further, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, which
reaffirmed the Secretary of Interior's duty to maintain the cross even
after the land transfer, was evidence that the sale was to a straw
purchaser. 27 7 Lastly, the government bypassed its normal
administrative procedure in selling public land to private purchasers,
indicating a vested interest in selection of an "appropriate"
purchaser.27 8 Indeed, by the time of Buono IV, the very history of the
cross was evidence of "unusual circumstances." 279 Therefore, in
contrast to Chambers v. City of Frederick,280 it is clear that a

reasonable observer, knowledgeable about the legislation and litigation
behind the Buono cross, would determine that the government
28 1 was
attempting to endorse a religious message through the land sale.
V. CONCLUSION

In Buono v. Kempthorne, the Ninth Circuit held that a
government-ordered land transfer of a piece of land within the Mojave
271. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 700.
272. Id. at 702.
273. Id. at 703.
274. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1082-86 (9th Cir. 2007).
275. Id.
276. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1181. Nonetheless, the Buono III and Buono IV courts gave too much weight
to the fact that the government sold the land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Post, who had a
history with the cross. Id. at 1180; Kempthorne, 502 F.3d at 1084. As the Mercier court noted,
it makes "practical sense" to sell the land to a party with a history with the religious symbol.
Mercier, 395 F.3d at 703.
279. Buono, 502 F.3d at 1085.
280. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573 (D. Md. 2005).
281.

Buono, 502 F.3d at 1086.
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National Preserve to a private party violated a district court's
permanent injunction against the display of a religious symbol, a Latin
cross, on that land.282 While the court was correct in determining that
the circumstances surrounding the land exchange indicated that the
transfer was actually a conveyance to a straw purchaser, 2 83 the court
nonetheless gave insufficient consideration to Supreme Court
precedent requiring that a court consider the context of a religious
symbol on public property before conclusively adjudicating an
Establishment Clause case.
Indeed, the Buono courts should have
considered factors such as the history of the cross, its location, and the
manner in which it was displayed before reaching its ultimate
conclusion. 285 The Ninth Circuit's known bias against conservativelymotivated parties 286 may have worked against it in the case at bar. It is
possible that it could have avoided extensive litigation had it simply
been open to considering the merits of the case for constitutionality or
reasonable methods of altering
the symbol and its surroundings to
287
ensure its constitutionality.

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 1071.
See supra Part 1V.B.
See supra Part IV.A.
Id.
See, e.g., DeForrest, supra note 231, at 617.
See supra Part IV.A.

